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Preserving nature for the benefit of all sentient individuals
Commentary on Treves et al. on Just Preservation
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Abstract: I agree with Treves et al.’s proposal for a preservation ethics based on the principle that
nonhuman well-being is a matter of justice and compassion. In this commentary, I advance two
objections. First, only sentient beings, rather than all life, belong in the moral community. Second,
given that nature is probably harmful overall for sentient individuals, preserving it for the benefit
of future human and nonhuman generations requires us to modify it as far as practicable.
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The target article by Treves et al. (2019) is commendable for raising the key question of “the ethics
and justice of preserving nature” within a robust anti-speciesist framework. The authors also
understand preservation, and rightly so in my view, as saving nature for posterity, rather than as
guaranteeing an ‘untouched’ and ‘permanent’ natural status quo. Thus, they set themselves the
task of identifying the axiological and normative principles that should govern our preservation
efforts. However, any such account should include, first, a criterion for identifying the future
entities for whose benefit nature is to be saved; and second, a criterion for identifying what is
beneficial and what is detrimental to such entities. In what follows, I shall endeavor to explain the
problems I see in Treves et al.’s proposals regarding these issues. I will also suggest how I think
they should be addressed.
Nature is to be preserved for all sentient beings. The first problem is that the authors do not
distinguish between the object of our preservation efforts — what is to be preserved — and the
subjects whom that preservation should benefit. On the one hand, they seem to embrace ethical
individualism as opposed to the holism espoused by commentators Washington (2019) and
Bergstrom (2019). Thus, Treves et al. concede that individuals are ‘the actual selves (not objects)
with claims’. It is to these selves that we directly owe duties of justice. If their ‘collectives
(populations, species, habitats, ecosystems)’ matter, it is only derivatively. That is, they do not
matter in themselves, but simply because they are composed of morally considerable individuals.
Yet, on the other hand, Treves et al. endorse too broad a concept of who merits moral
consideration. They of course include all human and nonhuman animals within the moral
community; but they also suggest that our moral concern ought to be extended to other natural
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entities they classify ‘as individuals’, who, they believe, possess interests and a well-being of their
own. All these individuals — human, animal and natural — would form the ‘community of life’
that is both the object and the beneficiary of preservation.
I think it is misguided to include individual natural entities within the moral community.
This would be in tension with the grounds for Treves et al.’s individualism and their rejection of
moral holism. They claim that individuals matter because they are selves. But it is possible for an
entity to be an individual without being a self. For instance, we have criteria that allow us to
distinguish between individual molecules, diamonds, asteroids, bicycles and cars, but none of
these individual entities is a ‘self’ except if it is conscious: or, in Nagel’s (1974) famous words, ‘if
there is something that it is like to be’ that entity.
Furthermore, only conscious entities can be sentient, i.e., have the capacity for feeling
states with positive and negative valences, such as pleasure and suffering. Being sentient is
necessary for having interests in attaining the one and avoiding the other — for having a wellbeing which can be increased or reduced by the actions of other sentient beings or by natural
events. Sentient beings are the only kinds of individuals who have moral claims and to whom we
can owe moral obligations.
It must be further noted that, as far as we know, not all individual natural entities are
sentient. Not even all individual organisms are. We have convincing evidence for the sentience of
all vertebrate animals, as well as some invertebrates like octopuses (Low et al. 2012; Mather
2019). We have strong but inconclusive evidence for the sentience of other invertebrate taxa, like
honeybees or ants (Klein & Barron 2016). We have scant physiological and behavioral evidence,
or none at all, for the sentience of jellyfishes, plants and unicellular organisms (Waldhorn 2019).
Thus, we must distinguish between insentient nature and the community of sentient
beings. It is for the benefit of future generations of human and nonhuman sentient individuals
that other organisms, ecosystems and the planet must be preserved.
Compassionate preservation requires us to intervene in nature. A second problem in Treves et
al.’s account of the ethics of preservation is that it seems to assume that nature does a good job
of promoting the interests of nonhuman sentients. On this assumption, the main issue that an
ethics of preservation should address is how to balance competing human and nonhuman
interests in the planet’s resources in a non-anthropocentric way. Past human interference in the
natural environment has undeniably been harmful for many nonhuman animals, as well as for
other humans. So, in this sense, Treves et al.’s proposal is a step in the right direction. If, as the
authors suggest, we should see nonhuman well-being ‘as a matter of justice as well as of
compassion’, harmful interventions in nature must be regarded as morally impermissible.
Nature itself, however, is likely to be harmful overall for wild nonhuman animals, who
constitute more than 99% of all sentient beings (Tomasik 2009). Suffering probably predominates
in their lives due to natural events. These include diseases, parasites, starvation, thirst, extreme
weather conditions and attacks by other animals (Faria 2016; Horta 2010; Ng 1995; Tomasik
2015). Nature is a moral catastrophe. Suppose we had the risk-free means and competence to
make nonhuman animals more resistant to illness, more efficient in processing nutrients and
water, as well as the means to control their populations in an ethical way. Suppose, in other
words, that we could successfully redesign nature and living organisms so as to ensure that as
many sentient beings as possible had good lives. Would we not be morally required to do so?
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The ethical question Treves et al. pose is: what kind of nature do we want to preserve for
future generations of sentient human and nonhuman individuals? I believe that when we observe
the facts, it becomes clear that we should not try to preserve nature as it would be were it not for
human intervention. Based on the compassionate preservation ethics the authors advocate, if
nature, as it is, is harmful overall for sentient beings, we should try to improve it, inasmuch as we
can.
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Call for Papers
Special Issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies
Plant Sentience: Theoretical and Empirical Issues
Guest Editors: Vicente Raja (Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University)
Miguel Segundo-Ortin (School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong)
In this special issue, we address the issue of plant sentience/consciousness from different
disciplines that combine both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Some of the
questions to be addressed in the special issue include the following:
•
•
•
•
•

Plants exhibit interesting behaviors; does this entail that they are conscious to some
extent?
What are the requirements for a living organism to be conscious? Do plants meet
these requirements?
What does the possibility of plant sentience/consciousness entail for the study of the
evolution of consciousness?
Is it just a categorical mistake to attribute consciousness to plants?
Can we talk about different levels or degrees of consciousness?
How to submit?
Deadline: June 1st, 2020

Please submit your papers (max. 9000 words including footnotes, references, abstract, etc.) to
vgalian@uwo.ca with subject “Paper Special Issue JCS”.
For more information, including bibliography and more detailed descriptions of the topics
and questions to be addressed in the papers submitted to the special issue, please contact
the guest editors at vgalian@uwo.ca (Vicente) or mso693@uowmail.edu.au (Miguel).
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